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Abstract 
This paper attempts to add to existing research on corporate payout by focusing 
on the role that the principal-agent problem plays on dividend policies of public and 
private banks. The results indicate that private banks are better able to monitor mangers 
use of excessive free cash flow and retaining earnings and will be more willing to let 




There have been many studies addressing the topic of companies return of capital 
to owners, and there are many competing and complementary theories on this subject!. 
This paper focuses on the residual dividend theory that suggests that companies should 
retain and reinvest earnings as long as returns on investments exceed the returns 
stockholders could obtain on other investments. This paper attempts to add to corporate 
payout research by focusing on the role that the principal-agent problem, which is 
inherent between managers and owners, plays on corporate payout policies when looked 
at through the residual dividend theory. While owners desire to have the greatest return 
on their contributed capital, managers often have incentive to grow the firm for the sake 
of growth. Famous investor Warren Buffet believes that owners desire the highest rate of 
return on their capital, so management should return it to owners if managers are unable 
to generate a higher rate of return than owners could obtain if the owners invested the 
extra capital elsewhere (Hagstrom, 2004). However, managers have incentives to cause 
firms to grow beyond optimal size. First of all, managers desire growth because it 
increases their power and the amount of resources they control, which is associated with 
higher compensation. Also, growth allows managers an easier way to retain and keep 
employees happy by creating a reward system that allows for more promotions because 
of the increased supply of positions due to the company's growth (Jensen, 1986). 
The problem is very clear with the hypothetical balance sheets of companies had 
they chosen not to pay dividends. According to DeAngelo (2004): 
1 See Allen and Michaely (2002) for an extensive review ofthe prior research 
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"had the 25 largest long-standing dividend -paying industrial firms in 
2002 not paid dividends, they would have cash holdings of $1.8 trillion 
(51 % of total assets), up from $160 billion (6% of assets), and $1.2 trillion 
in excess of their collective $600 billion in long term debt. Absent 
dividends, these firms would have huge cash balances and little to no 
leverage." 
All of this excess cash would be available for investment into projects and acquisitions 
with no additional investment opportunities. Warren Buffet believes that "just as work 
expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak 
up available funds." (Hagstrom, 2004). As a result of this excess cash managers likely 
would have invested in less profitable opportunities resulting in a decrease in return on 
equity. Therefore, in order to minimize the principal-agent problems with managers, 
owners usually demand for capital to be returned when they see a buildup in cash from 
retained earnings (DeAngelo, 2004). 
In order to test the principal-agent problem, this paper will focus on the banking 
sector because both private and public banks have to file publicly viewable call reports 
with the Federal Reserve Banks. Therefore, the difference between public and private 
banks decisions to return capital to owners can be tested. The main difference between 
public and private banks is their ownership structure. While public banks tend to have 
many shareholders who are disconnected from management, private banks generally have 
fewer owners who tend to be more actively engaged in managing or overseeing the banks 
management. This study finds that private and public banks do indeed respond 
differently to large free cash flow and high retained earnings. Public banks tend to return 
more capital as free cash flow and retained earnings increase compared to private banks. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a survey of existing 
literature on the role that principal-agent costs play on corporate payout policy, section 3 
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describes the data used in this study, section 4 examines the empirical models used to test 
the theory laid out in section 3, section 5 discusses the results of the linear regressions 
and section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Theory / Literature Review 
According to Miller, Merton, and Modigliani, (1961) investors should be 
indifferent to corporate payout policy when valuing shares as long as the corporation's 
investment strategy remains the same. Investors should be indifferent if a company 
retains all of its earnings, because if investment remains the same the company will grow 
at the same rate and investors can mimic dividends by selling off a portion of their 
holdings. However, this line of reasoning doesn't hold up if investment decisions are 
affected by payout policy. Harford (1999) found that firms with large cash flows are 
more likely to attempt acquisitions and that those acquisitions tend to be value decreasing 
compared to companies with smaller cash flows. He notes that this provides strong 
evidence of principal-agent problems in cash rich firms and that the market tends to 
punish the cash rich firms who distribute little to none of their excessive free cash flow. 
This suggests that payout policy can influence investment decisions, so therefore 
shareholders shouldn't be indifferent to payout policy. 
One way of measuring the principal-agent problem is retained earnings relative to 
the size of the company. Another measure is free cash flow, as defined by the amount of 
cash a company brings in through its income generating operations in excess of cash that 
is required to fund all projects exceed a required rate of return, as a key way to measure 
the principal-agent problem between managers and owners. DeAngelo (2004) argues 
that, as investors see retained earnings accumulate, they will increasingly pressure 
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managers to pay more dividends. Others, including Jensen (1986), tend to focus on the 
role free cash flow plays in increasing the principal-agent problem. Owners tend to focus 
on retained earnings and free cash flow as a potential problem for overinvestment 
because it is not subject to the same market discipline and monitoring that stock issues or 
debt is. If companies are reinvesting their funds inefficiently or plan an inefficient use 
for funds, it will be reflected in higher prices for capital if companies seek outside 
funding. Banks and investors purchasing new shares issued will penalize companies that 
are run inefficiently or have plans to invest in unprofitable projects however internally 
generated cash and equity carry no interest rate if they are to be reinvested back into the 
company. Therefore, earned equity more plausibly gives managers the opportunity to 
wastefully overinvest (DeAngelo, 2004). 
Many studies on corporate payout polices tend to ignore share repurchases as an 
avenue of returning capital. Since 1982 there has been a significant increase in the 
number of shares repurchased, which makes using dividends alone less representative of 
capital returned to shareholders than it was in the past (Fama, 2000). This increase in 
repurchases is largely due to the SEC adopting Rule lOb-18 in 1982, which diminished 
the risk of companies coming under investigation for manipulating stock price under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In fact, 1998 was the first year since Rule I Ob-18 in 
which cash distributed through stock repurchases actually exceeded cash distributed 
through dividends (Allen and Michaely, 2002). In a survey of financial executives, most 
executives responded that ideally their companies would rely heavily on share 
repurchases to return capital (Brav, 2005). Much of that is due to the fact that volatile 
share repurchase plans are more accepted by the market than volatile dividend payments. 
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Also, financial executives listed having excess cash or fewer profitable investments 
available as two of the main reasons they repurchased shares (Brav, 2005). This lends 
evidence that we should be including share repurchases as an additional measure of 
returned capital and also that capital is often paid out to avoid overinvesting. A dollar of 
dividends should be weighted the same as a dollar of share repurchases because if there 
was a significant disadvantage to using one form of capital repayment, no rational 
manager would essentially throw money away using an inefficient avenue to return 
capital. 
Allen and Michaely (2002) note that a weakness in the principal-agent theory of 
corporate payout policy is that there is not a strong and clear mechanism for shareholders 
to induce managers to payout excessive cash flow and earnings. However, the literature 
provides several possible explanations. The most common way for shareholders to 
influence managers' policy is to vote with their money by bidding down share prices for 
companies which don't properly mitigate their principal-agent problems. This is 
effective if managers have significant ownership positions. Harford (1999) found 
evidence from market reactions to acquisition attempts that lends evidence that 
managerial stock ownership is seen to lessen principal-agent problems. He found that the 
more insider ownership there is of a company's stock the more positive the market reacts 
to deals announced by that company. Another way to make voting with your money 
effective in inducing corporations to return more capital is for companies to have 
managers' compensation be in the form of stock options. Penn and Liang (2001) found 
that the use of stock options can be effective in mitigating serious principal-agent 
problems, but also noted that it also shifted payout from dividends to repurchases because 
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holders of stock options do not receive dividends. Voting with the wallet is also effective 
if companies desire to obtain more funds in the future from issuing new stock because 
then managers will have an incentive to raise the stock price in order to obtain better 
financing. 
Pozen (1994) focuses on the role that institutional investors play on influencing 
payout policy. Managers that have incentives to drive up their stock price, have a strong 
incentive to please institutional investors because they are often a strong driving force 
behind stock prices. However, the vote with your money approach is significantly less 
effective if management is able to finance all of their projects internally. Also, 
sometimes institutional investors have strong tax and transaction costs incentives that 
lead them to lobby management for changes rather than sell out their position. If 
institutional investors choose to hold on to their position, they have several ways to 
influence management decisions to return capital. They can utilize, proxy fights for 
control, proxy campaigns against management proposals, shareholder resolutions, 
informal jawboning, and explanatory letters, each getting progressively cheaper and more 
used by institutional investors. Institutional investors can use these ways to directly 
influence management's payout policy or they can use their influence on the company's 
board of directors (Pozen, 1994). 
White (1996) focuses on the role of the board of directors in this principal-agent 
problem. The board of directors is supposed to be overseeing management on behalf of 
shareholders but often is comprised of members inside of management. Institutional 
investors can use their influence to make sure that there are more outsiders part of the 
board of directors. Outsiders on the board of directors have significant personal 
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incentives to back shareholders interests so they can work on other boards. Also, 
shareholders can make use of dividend provisions that tie bonuses to dividend payouts. 
A common dividend provision is to limit the bonus pool available for employees and 
executives to some factor of dividends paid, or to set it up so that there is a sharp drop in 
bonus money available if dividends are cut. These types of dividend clauses are often 
found in large companies with slow growth that would likely be able to internally fund 
future projects (White, 1996). 
In order to test this theory, this paper uses the set up of Cloyd's study in 2005, 
where he uses the banking sector to test how differing ownership structures affect 
dividend payments. Cloyd (2005) reasons that public and private banks will have varying 
degrees of principal-agent problems between managers and stockholders because of their 
different ownership structures, which will result in differences in payout policies 
between public and private companies. He says that because private banks' owners tend 
to be more directly involved in the management or oversight of management, there is less 
of a principal-agent problem in private banks than in public banks. Because there is less 
of a principal-agent problem, private bank owners will be more willing to let excess 
funds pile up with less fear of a renegade manager pursuing growth beyond that which is 
beneficial to owners (Cloyd, 2005). 
Cloyd (2005) believes that his public versus private principal-agent problem is 
comparable to a cross country sample of firm's likelihood to pay out dividends because 
typical ownership structure of companies differs from country to country. La Porta 
(1999) conducted a study that found that countries with poor shareholder protection were 
more likely to have controlling shareholders who either managed the company directly or 
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were in a position to closely monitor managers. Whereas, countries with better 
shareholder protection laws were more likely to have more owners who were less 
involved in the company. In a follow up study he found that countries with poor 
shareholder protection, where shareholders are more likely to be more involved in 
running the company, had a dividend payout ratio lower than in countries with greater 
shareholder protection laws (La Porta, 2000). If the true cause of the lower dividend 
payout in countries with less shareholder protection is ownership structure and 
involvement, then we would expect to also see lower payout ratios among private banks 
than public banks because of similar differences in shareholder involvement. 
A Fama and French (2000) study on the characteristics of dividend payers shows 
that dividend payments are positively related to size, capitalization and profitability 
because all of those characteristics increase a company's ability to pay out dividends 
(Fama, 2000). Clearly, a company with high earnings is going to be able to pay out more 
dividends than a company with no earnings that would likely have to borrow or liquidate 
assets in order to pay out dividends. Fama and French also found that dividend payments 
are negatively related to growth. Strong growth is a strong indicator that the company 
has superior investment opportunities and therefore a strong incentive to reinvest 
earnings (Fama, 2000). This can be seen in Buffett's company Berkshire Hathaway 
which has yet to pay any dividends because more wealth can be generated on owner's 
equity than owners could generate elsewhere if they had some of their capital returned to 
them (Hagstrom, 2004). 
After reviewing the relevant literature, we are left with a basic marginal cost­
benefit graph for retained earned equity. Figure 1 shows the marginal benefit curve as 
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being downward sloping because not all investment opportunities are equal and rational 
companies will invest in the best opportunities first. There also exists a marginal cost 
curve, because there are opportunity costs; each dollar retained could be returned and 
earn interest elsewhere. Also reflected in the marginal cost curve, are the costs of 
monitoring management to make sure they are using retained funds effectively. 
However, private companies' owners are more involved in running a company and 
therefore have a lower cost of monitoring managers for any quantity of retained capital 
Therefore, the private cost curve will be shifted down from the public cost curve and 
ceteris paribus, a private company will retain a higher quantity of its capital. The 
assumption in this graph is constant returns to scale for the cost of monitoring additional 
funds and therefore a perfectly flat cost curve, however this assumption is not essential to 
the hypothesis. The important assumption is that the public cost curve is shifted up from 
the private cost curve. 
In summary, the literature review and theory section suggest that the amount of 
capital returned depends on several factors. A bank's growth, capitalization, size, and 
profitability all affect a bank's ability to return capital, while its growth, amount of 
previous retained capital, free cash flow and ownership structure, all affect bank 
management's desire to return capital. Therefore, if all other factors are kept constant and . 
a company found itself at point Z, due to total earnings and cash flow during the quarter, 
in Figure 1, owners would desire to be at point Y if it was a private company or point X if 
was a public company. Therefore, in order to move to its equilibrium point, a company 
would return capital equal to Qz -Qy if it was a private company or Qz-Qx if it was a 
public company. With Qz, Qx and Qy being the corresponding amount of capital retained 
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related to points Z, X, and Y. Because the marginal benefit curve is downward sloping 
and private companies have a lower cost curve, public companies will return more capital 
to owners than private companies if all other factors are controlled for. 
Figure 1: Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of Retained Funds 
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3. Data 
Marginal Benefits and Marginal Costs of Retained Equity 
Quantity of Funds Retained 
-- Marginal Benefit of 
Retained Funds 
-- Marginal Cost of 
Funds for Public 
BHC's 
-- Marginal Cost of 
Funds for Private 
BHC's 
This study uses data from Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and looks at the call 
reports from private and public bank holding companies. By restricting the data set to 
only bank holding companies, the effect of principal-agent costs on dividend payouts can 
be tested for because of differing ownership structures within the banking industry. Data 
is used from all four quarters of 2004 because there was a change in tax law enacted in 
2003 that brings the income tax paid on dividends down to the same level as that paid on 
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long term capital gains. This minimizes the different tax incentives that companies face 
for dividend payments versus retaining capital. Also, the year 2004 was chosen because 
it was unaffected by the recent credit crunch, which is likely to greatly influence any 
bank study's results because of the extreme circumstances. 
4. Empirical Model 
The simple linear regression model shown in Table 1 tests whether public and 
private banks react differently to potential principal-agent problems. The dependent 
variable in the main model is the sum of cash spent on dividends and cash spent on share 
repurchases for the quarter divided by total assets. This differs from the Cloyd (2005) 
study which focuses on dividends and did not include share repurchases in the dependent 
variable. Fama and French (2000) argue that changes in treasury stock, which is common 
stock that a company owns in itself, is a good barometer for share repurchases and 
reissuance but Allen and Michaely (2002) note that changes in treasury stock can be a 
problematic way to measure payout because often companies retire shares when they 
repurchase them, which bias the reported amount of repurchases down. Also, using 
change in treasury stock runs into other complications. For example, when companies 
pay out stock for stock options to executives it usually comes from treasury stock. This 
means that by using change in treasury stock as a measure of repurchases a researcher 
picks up not only the financing decisions of share repurchases but also the investing 
decision in the compensation to executives. Instead Allen and Michaely (2002) 
recommend using cash spent on repurchases as shown on the statement of cash flows, 
which is what this study does. Model 2 and 3 look at the same independent variables but 
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separate out dividends and share repurchases into two dependent variables to see if these 
two means of returning capital are used to mitigate principal-agent problems in a similar 
way. 
The regressions include a dummy variable for ownership, which takes on a value 
of 0 if the bank is public and 1 if a bank is private. This variable will catch the 
differences between public and private banks' payout policies that are not picked up by 
the interaction variables. These interaction variables between ownership structure and 
retained earnings divided by total assets, and between ownership structure and free cash 
flow are the key variables to focus on in the regressions. They will show whether theory 
is correct in predicting a higher payout ratio for public banks compared to private banks. 
In theory, the interaction variables will have a negative and significant coefficient for 
reasons stated earlier. If indeed, these interaction variables are negative while the 
original variable is positive it will lend strong evidence that indeed dividends are paid out 
to mitigate principal-agent problems and that private and public companies have differing 
princiapal-agent costs. It is unclear whether the dummy variable will have a negative 
coefficient or not. It depends on the differences between public and private banks that 
are not picked up by the two interaction variables that attempt to address the principal­
agent issue. A true measure of free cash flow isn't used but cash from operations scaled 
for total assets is a pretty good approximation. Cash from operations less cash spent 
investing could have been used and would have better fit the traditional measure of free 
cash flow but it is inappropriate to assume that all the companies invested only what was 
prudent when this paper is built upon the assumption that managers have incentives to 
overinvest. Instead, by scaling operating cash flow by total assets it assumes that free 
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cash flow available is a function of total assets. This assumption is appropriate because 
depreciation of assets, with the exception of land and goodwill, is required by United 
States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Depreciation can be used as an 
approximation of minimum capital expenditures. Since depreciation is expected to be 
some factor of total assets and this factor should be relatively consistent from company to 
company because they are all bank holding companies, the scaling of operating cash flow 
by total assets normalizes it by bank size and also provides an approximation of free cash 
flow. It is not necessary to specify this factor because it would only affect the coefficient 
proportionately to the factor and would not influence the significance. 
In order to correct for other possible differences in characteristics between public 
and private banks that would likely affect the results, some control variables have been 
included. To control for liquidity and profitability differences, the models include cash 
flow from operations. One would expect this to have a positive effect because increased 
liquidity allows banks to pay out dividends without significantly increasing the risk of not 
being able to meet short term debts, and increased profitability also allows for more 
dividends to be paid out. In order to control for principal-agent problems, retained 
earnings over total assets is included. The last control variable in the models is growth. 
This study uses percent change in quarterly earnings before taxes and extraordinary items 
compared to the previous quarter. It is slightly flawed in that it might be biased because 
of seasonal changes, how volatile quarterly earnings are and how short term the measure 
of growth is, but it should be an adequate measure of growth. Earnings before taxes and 
extraordinary items is included because it should result in a better look at true operations 
and smooth out extra variability that can be caused by taxes and extraordinary items. As 
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mentioned before, growth should be negatively related to payout because companies 
should retain more of their capital if they have better investment opportunities available. 
Also, because this study is looking at banks, it is important to include capitalization as a 
variable. If banks are struggling to meet the minimum capital reserve requirements, then 
they would be foolish to return capital. As a measure of capitalization the paper uses the 
bank's tier 1 capital, which is a bank's core capital and includes common stock equity 
and retained earnings and divided it by total liabilities. As discussed earlier, theory 
predicts a positive coefficient in front of the tier 1 ratio. 
Although other studies have included other variables the models in this paper are 
limited to the control variables mentioned above. Total assets is not included as a 
independent variable because many of the other factors are already scaled for total assets. 
Past studies have included lagged dividends because public firms have an aversion to 
decreasing dividends. However, lagged dividends introduce a circular logic problem 
because then the model is testing current dividend policy based on past dividend policy, 
which was based on the same decision currently being tested (DeAngelo, 2004). Also, 
previous studies have used cash on hand as a predictor of dividends being paid out, but 
cash tends to fluctuate greatly for a variety of reasons that could confound the results. 
While large cash balances could be a build up of retained earnings waiting to be paid out, 
they could also be the result of a new capital infusion to finance a profitable investment 
opportunity in which case they would not be used for returning capital (DeAngelo, 2004). 
So in both cases cash increased greatly but it is caused by a factor that is covered in other 
control variables. Instead, cash flow is used because that is a better measure of cash 
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available to be invested or returned over the entire quarter rather than a glimpse at cash 
holdings at the quarterly cutoff date. 
Table 1: Empirical Model 
Dependent 
PAYOUT (Cash spent on Dividends + Cash spent on Repurchases) / Total Assets 
DIVPAYOUT (Cash spent on Dividends) / Total Assets 
REPPAYOUT (Cash spent on Repurchases) / Total Assets 
Independent 
PRIVATE Public (0) or Private (1) 
REITA Retained Earnings / Total Assets 
PRIVATE*REIT A PRIVATE* (Retained Earnings / Total Assets) 
FCF Cash flow from operations/ Total Assets 
PRIVATE*FCF PRIVATE * (Cash flow from operations / Total Assets) 
Earnings before extraordinary items and taxes / 
GROWTH Previous quarters earnings before extraordinary 
items and taxes 
TIER1 Total Tier 1 capital /Total Liabilities 
02 Dummy for quarter 2 
03 Dummy for quarter 3 
04 Dummy for quarter 4 
5. Results 
Table 2 illustrates differences between public and private companies. Public 
companies and private bank holding companies do not pay out significantly different 
amount of capital when controlled for total assets. However, all of the factors included in 
our regression that are believed to affect payout are significantly different. 
As predicted in the theory section, public companies tend to have lower retained 
earnings as a percentage of total assets than private companies do. However, this could 
be due to factors other than a bank's decision to payout earnings and capital. Private 
companies had significantly higher cash flow, which was theorized to lead to higher 
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payout ratios. However, growth was significantly higher for private companies which 
would lead to private companies paying out less capital. Based on private companies 
having higher free cash flow and higher retained earnings, the fact that both public and 
private companies have the same payout means that either privates banks' higher growth 
must play a large role in the dividend decision or else the build up of equity and free cash 
flow affects public and private banks' payout decision quite differently. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Means 
Combined Public Private Significance 
PAYOUT 0.0030 0.0030 0.0030 0.725 
DIVPAYOUT 0.0026 0.0021 0.0023 0.011 
REPPAYOUT 0.0006 0.0009 0.0006 0.000 
TA (Millions) 6.3924 14.542 3.0386 0.000 
RETA 0.0588 0.0465 0.0638 0.000 
FCF 0.0027 0.0024 0.0028 0.002 
GROWTH 0.2506 0.1525 0.2916 0.100 
TIER1 0.1041 0.1043 0.1041 0.883 
The results from the regressions in Table 3 seem to reinforce the assumption that 
differing ownership structures in banks affects banks' decisions to return capital. Based 
on the results it appears that the principal-agent problem plays a significant role in how 
much capital is returned to owners. The adjusted R 1\2 for Model 1 is only .240 which 
suggests that there is much of banks , payout policies are left unexplained by these models 
but, nevertheless, the regressions have meaningful results. 
The coefficient for the variable retained earnings divided by total assets has a 
significant and positive effect on capital returned. Based on the regression, for every 
increase in public bank holding companies' retained earnings equal to 1 % of total assets, 
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the banks' capital returned increased by .024% of total assets. Also, the coefficient for 
the free cash flow variable has a positive and significant coefficient. Based on the 
regression, a $1 increase in cash flow from operations results in a $0.337 increase in 
payout. This is consistent with the study by Cloyd (2005), who found that public banks 
paid out more dividends as retained earnings increased relative to total assets and with 
other studies such as Jensen (1986) that suggest that dividends increase as free cash flow 
increases. 
Table 3: Regression Results 
Model 1, Adj. RA2 = Model 2 Adj.RA2 = Model 3, Adj. RA2 = 
.240. Sample size .368, Sample size .023, Sample size 
8656 8656 8656 
Dependent 
PAYOUT DIVPAYOUT REPPAYOUT 
Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. 
Variable 
Constant -3.832E-5 0.810 0.000 0.162 0.000 0.382 
PRIVATE 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 8.537E-5 0.527 
REITA 0.024 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.009 0.000 
PRIVATE*REIT A -0.015 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.004 0.077 
FCF 0.337 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.100 0.000 
PRIVATE*FCF -0.033 0.066 0.078 0.000 -0.111 0.000 
GROWTH -6.134E-6 0.654 -2.761 E-6 0.754 -3.373E-6 0.745 
TIER1 0.000 0.423 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 
02 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.018 
03 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
04 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
An important finding was that the interaction between retained earnings divided 
by total assets and the ownership structure dummy variable had a significant and negative 
coefficient. This suggests that, in fact, private banks do have a different cost curve when 
it comes to retaining capital. When the interaction variable is taken together with the 
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original retained earnings divided by total assets variable, our regression suggests that for 
every increase in a private bank holding company's retained earnings equal to 1 % of 
assets that bank's returned capital only increases by .009% of assets, as compared to 
.024% for public banks. The private bank coefficient for RE/TA is seen by adding the 
RE/T A coefficient and the coefficient from the interaction variable between RE/T A and 
ownership structure. Clearly, the two banks types are experiencing different cost curves 
for funds. Past theory suggests that this is due to ownership structure and its effect on the 
principal-agent problem between owners and managers. It is not clear based on the 
regression above whether the .009% increase is significant; however it is not crucial that 
this effect be positive. Cloyd (2005) found that for private banks there was an 
insignificant relationship between dividends and retained earnings as related to total 
assets. An inverse relationship between returned capital and retained earnings in private 
banks would not indicate that there is no principal-agent problem; it would just indicate 
that perhaps retained earnings divided by total assets picks up another relationship. The 
important thing to see is that the interaction variable is negative and significant. 
The fact that the interaction variable between free cash flow and ownership 
structure also had a negative and significant coefficient lends even more evidence to the 
principal-agent theory on payout. When looked at together with the coefficient for free 
cash flow private banks only paid out $0.304 for every $1 increase in free cash flow 
compared to public banks who paid out $0.337 for every $1 increase in free cash flow. 
While this could possibly have a few different causes it does fit with the principal-agent 
prediction. 
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In order to look at the aggregate affect of both interaction variables along with the 
Private variable I looked at the theoretical case of two average banks. If two average 
banks as defined by the combined means from Table 2 are put in the Model 1 :from Table 
3 and one is private and the other is public it becomes clear that the graph in Figure 1 
holds up to empirical testing. If that average bank were private it would return funds in 
the fourth quarter equal to 0.432% of its assets, while if public it would return funds 
equal to 0.475% of its assets in the form of dividends or share repurchase. The 
coefficient for PRIV ATE would result in private banks returning additional earnings 
equal to .000539% of assets while the interaction variable with FCF would reduce capital 
returned by .0000896% and the interaction variable would reduce capital returned by 
.000873%. The interaction variables combine to trump the affects of the PRIVATE 
result but it appears that the PRIV ATE*RE/TA interaction variable is the responsible for 
the majority of the difference. 
The growth variable has the expected negative coefficient but is not significant. 
This is unexpected and doesn't fit with the residual theory of dividends. However, the 
insignificance potentially is from the poor measure of growth used in these models. The 
growth variable simply looks at quarterly growth, which tends to be more volatile than 
looking at a long term growth. It can also be biased because of seasonality or other short 
term trends or results in the market. When analyzing the average company's earning 
growth in the different quarters it is clear that quarterly growth is volatile. In the first 
quarter average growth was -.7353 while the second quarter had average company 
growth of .9256. The other two quarters fell in-between those two extremes, but it is 
clear that such a volatile measure of growth could influence results. 
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When looking at the regressions for Model 2 and Model 3 it is interesting to note 
that the decision to pay out dividends is significantly different than the decision to return 
capital in the form of share repurchases. When it comes to paying dividends it appears 
that ownership structures have significantly different views on the build up of retained 
earnings as shown by public banks increasing dividends by $0.015 for every dollar 
increase in retained earnings, everything else equal, while private banks would only 
increase dividends by $0.004 for the same increase in retained earnings. Similarly, public 
banks payout $0.009 more capital in the form of repurchases for every $1 increase in 
earnings, while private banks would payout only $0.005 more for a similar increase. 
Surprisingly, private banks actually pay out more dividends as their free cash flow 
increases compared to public banks. This may be due to several reasons including the 
increased flexibility of dividends for private banks so they are a more perfect substitute 
for repurchases in private banks than public banks or increased liquidity considerations of 
individual owners. However, when looking at repurchases, public banks significantly 
increase their share repurchases when free cash flow increases, while private banks 
actually have a negative coefficient, which is likely insignificant. Because retained 
earnings are a more long term measure and are built up over a period of time while free 
cash flow is a temporary quarterly measure, the results from this study seem to suggest 
that in order to mitigate principal-agent problems, companies address long term issues 
through dividends while mitigating potential short term problems through share 
repurchases. This seems to lend additional evidence to Jonathan, Stephens and Weisbach 
(2000) who found evidence that dividends were paid out from permanent earnings while 
repurchases were paid out from temporary cash flows. 
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6. Conclusion 
Payout policy is significantly influenced by the principal-agent problem between 
managers and agents. Managers have incentives to invest beyond the level that is optimal 
for owners. They stand to benefit from growth for the sake of growth while OWners 
would like to maximize their return on their capital whether it is from reinvesting the 
retained earnings back into the bank or by investing that capital in another opportunity 
after banks have returned it. Therefore, as a bank's retained earnings increase and as free 
cash flow increases owners will want more capital returned in order to minimize the 
possibility of mangers over investing. 
However, our study lends evidence that because private banks tend to have more 
involved owners there is less of a principal-agent problem inherent in private banks. 
Therefore private banks have a different cost curve when it comes to retaining earnings 
and will be more willing to let retained earnings build up without returning them to 
owners in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. Our study tends to confirm that 
DeAngelo (2004) was correct in theorizing that dividends are paid out to avoid 
overinvesting. It also agrees with both the Cloyd (2005) and the LaPorta (2000) studies 
that found that with greater ownership involvement there is less of an incentive to pay out 
dividends to avoid overinvestment. 
This study has little to no macroeconomic policy implications. However, it does 
potentially have some microeconomic implications. If it is assumed that most banks are 
behaving rationally, a tougher argument to make these days, then we can make inferences 
into whether or not an individual bank is returning capital optimally. A bank that returns 
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more capital than is expected might be seen negatively because they are potentially 
passing up profitable growth opportunities, while a bank that pays out too little might 
also be seen negatively because they might not properly be mitigating potential principal­
agent problems. 
Future research on this subject could improve the measure of growth used in this 
study to something that is a little more long term and less volatile than quarter over 
quarter growth. It would also be interesting to include a variable that looks at whether or 
not companies issued debt or equity in the quarter or if they do frequently. If companies 
are forced to subject themselves to outside monitoring the shareholders might be more 
willing to let companies retain funds. However, this could be problematic because if 
companies are looking for outside funding they probably don't have funds available to be 
returned to owners. Allen and Michaely also pointed out that a measure of corporate 
payout is biased if it doesn't include cash paid out to shareholders in merger and 
acquisition activities so correcting for that would improve the paper. Another interesting 
avenue for future research would look into why companies choose repurchases over 
dividends. The two models looking at repurchase and dividend decisions independently 
of each other and looking at the how differing ownership structure affected payout 
decisions provided interesting results. 
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